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book review
Troublesome Reﬂ ection: Racism as the Blind Spot 
in the Scientiﬁ c Critique of Race
Charles C. Roseman1
A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New York: Penguin Press, 
2014. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95.
In A Troublesome Inheritance, Nicholas Wade seeks to use advances in genomics and com-parative human biology to revivify hereditarian 
racialist notions about the ways in which difffer-
ences among human societies are shaped by evo-
lutionary forces acting on genetic variation. The arc 
of the argument consists of three claims: (1) human 
evolution has produced some unspecifĳied number 
of races; (2) diffferences among these races in social 
dispositions have a strong genetic component; and 
(3) an oppressive academic environment keeps 
this kind of research out of the intellectual main-
stream. These claims form the core of a world view 
that I refer to as “hereditarian racialism.” Recent 
examples of this genera include The Bell Curve 
(Herrnstein and Murray 1994) and Race, Evolution, 
and Behavior (Rushton 1995), with examples ex-
tending back for some time (e.g., Grant 1970 [1912]). 
None of these claims are true. The book is neither 
good popular science writing nor all that new or 
interesting by the standards of the hereditarian 
racialist literature. (Rushton [1995] and Miele and 
Sarich [2005] are far more interesting examples of 
this genera.) Troublesome Inheritance, however, is a 
useful foil for a critical examination of the mainline 
scientifĳic critique of hereditarian racialism, which, 
as it stands, is weak and scattered. To recuperate a 
useful scientifĳic critique of race, we need to come 
to grips with ways in which the political processes 
of racism have shaped human organisms over the 
last few hundred years.
Genomic Variation and Human 
Population History and Structure
Contrary to Wade’s assertion, all parties to contro-
versies surrounding human variation agree that 
humans show genomic and phenotypic variation 
that is structured in geographic space, through 
time, and across many social divisions. The dis-
agreement is over how best to describe and model 
the evolutionary causes of this variation. Ignoring 
for the moment the large changes in the distribu-
tion of human genetic variation over the last few 
centuries (more on that below under Evolutionary 
Consequences of Racism), we can build a range of 
evolutionary models and statistically compare their 
fĳit to available genomic data.
In this idiom, racial models of variation like 
the one advocated in Troublesome Inheritance 
take the form of something like the tree diagram 
in Figure 1A (Hunley et al. 2009; Long and Kittles 
2003). Groups within a race share common an-
cestry with one another more recently than they 
do with groups in other races. In contrast, most 
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narrative accounts of recent human evolution 
feature population fĳissioning and founding events 
reflecting the movement of groups into difffer-
ent regions (previously occupied or not; see, e.g., 
Henn et al. 2012). Out-of-Africa dispersals and 
the spread of agriculture are two examples of 
these kinds of events. In this case, we might start 
with an estimate of a tree of patterns of common 
ancestry among groups under the expectation 
that groups with more recent common ancestry 
should be more genetically similar than those with 
distant common ancestry (Long and Kittles 2003, 
2009; Long et al. 2009; Pickrell and Pritchard 
2012). We can then add in admixture (episodic 
mixing of previously isolated groups) and gene 
flow between groups to produce a more elaborate 
model (Hunley et al. 2009; Pickrell and Pritchard 
2012; Prüfer et al. 2014). The result is something 
like the elaborate model sketched out in Figure 
1B, which is far and away the best fĳit to population 
genomic data. The relative importance of the 
diffferent processes that make up these models are 
still a matter for further research, but it is certain 
that the racial model is a poor fĳit to the data and 
does not allow us to generate new and interesting 
questions.
Human Phenotypic Evolution
In the case of Wade’s second claim about among-
group diffferences in innate social propensities, 
he admits that much of his work is speculative, 
and I shall not engage with the bulk of it. He does 
make statements of what he regards as matters of 
fact about relationships between race and skull 
morphology. I focus on skull morphology because 
we know quite a bit about its evolution, and how it 
is used in Troublesome Inheritance will be an indica-
tor of the rigor with which issues in phenotypic 
evolution are represented throughout the book.
Wade makes the claim that “human skulls fall 
into three distinctive shapes, which reflect their 
owner’s degree of ancestry in the three main races, 
Caucasian, East Asian, and African” (***) and that 
skulls can be matched with race with better than 
80% success. Wade claims that a fĳive-race taxon-
omy enjoys genomic support, and even though fĳive 
does not equal three, he still gestures back to skull 
morphology as proof of race. The fĳirst thing to point 
out is that these techniques (discriminant function 
analysis) require races to be defĳined ahead of time, 
and then a statistical model is built that maximizes 
the diffferences between the predefĳined groups. 
The techniques do not fĳind groups; they simply 
assign individuals to groups. There is not a stitch of 
evolutionary theory informing this practice.
If we use the discriminant function methods to 
test whether pairs of predefĳined groups are races, we 
end up with races galore, not the inconsistently enu-
merated few from Troublesome Inheritance. People 
from northern and southern Japan would come 
from diffferent races, as would those from Austria 
and Norway (Ousley et al. 2009). Moreover, these 
techniques behave badly when challenged with 
skulls of individuals from groups not included in 
the samples used to build the methods and are often 
no better than random chance (Konigsberg et al. 
2009). You will not read in Troublesome Inheritance 
that we know that random genetic drift, mutation, 
and gene flow have led to a pattern and magnitude 
of among-group cranial variation that bears a hazy 
resemblance to what we gather from population 
genomic analysis (Betti et al. 2010; von Cramon-
Taubadel 2014; Lynch 1990; Relethford 1994; Rose-
man 2004; Weaver et al. 2008). Exceptions to this 
general trend appear in the form of natural selection 
FIGURE 1. Models of population structure and history. Black lines indicate evolving lineages and 
recency of common ancestry, with time going from le
  to right. The numbered tips of the lineages 
are operationally deﬁ ned groups of individuals. The length of a line segment reﬂ ects the cumulative 
eﬀ ect of genetic dri
 , not time elapsed. (A) The race model as classically conceived and argued 
for by Wade. Group membership in races is indicated by encompassing boxes. (B) An elaborated 
model with a complex pattern of common ancestry, gene ﬂ ow, and admixture among groups. 
Double arrows indicate recurring gene ﬂ ow between groups, and single arrows indicate episodes of 
admixture.
and nongenetic efffects acting in population- and 
region-specifĳic ways. The rapidity of human cranial 
evolution is unusual among mammals and presents 
a vital window into issues of constraint and evolv-
ability that are at the core of current problems in 
evolutionary theory (Lynch 1990; Martinez-Abadias 
et al. 2012; Weaver et al. 2007, 2008).
It is telling that Troublesome Inheritance omits 
any reference to this work, especially since it is a 
nexus between the study of phenotypes and ge-
nomes of the kind that Wade thinks brings so much 
explanatory power to problems in human evolution 
(Roseman and Weaver 2007). Instead, he bases 
his arguments about the cranium on a forensic 
literature that has no evolutionary content and 
offfers no causal explanation for variation. The lack 
of rigor in dealing with this relatively simple issue 
makes me doubt the veracity of his claims about 
other aspects of phenotype.
A Badly Run Conspiracy
I think that the primary reason for ignoring the 
hereditarian racialist literature on intelligence and 
other psychological characteristics has little to do 
with peer pressure. This point is hard to prove and 
certainly merits some investigation by a qualifĳied 
social scientist, but my own impression from talk-
ing to colleagues is that the avoidance stems from 
the fact that these traits are difffĳicult to study, and 
the work that is being done on them is seen as 
being largely of bad quality. Contemporary scholars 
of human variation do not avoid talking about 
the interactions between biological evolution and 
human societies in cases where we have the data, 
methods, and theory to do so with rigor. The ways 
in which humans, plants, animals, and pathogens 
have coevolved during the development of agricul-
ture and pastoralism are exciting and vibrant fĳields 
of research (Kwiatkowski 2005; Perry et al. 2007; 
Gignoux et al. 2011; Skoglund et al. 2014). Socially 
mediated genotype-by-environment interactions 
are also the object of increasing scrutiny (Gravlee 
et al. 2009).
The diversity of opinion about the causes and 
patterning of human variation within the scientifĳic 
community (see Edgar and Hunley 2009) would 
seem to indicate that if there is a conspiracy to 
silence hereditarian racialist views, it is very badly 
run. Some of this variation in opinion is the result 
of the practice of good science, in which multiple 
explanations for problems are put forth and argued 
about. Some of the variation in opinion, however, 
could be a product of the fragmentation of the 
study of human biology (Auerbach and Cabana 
2013). Molecular and morphological specialists 
were famously at odds with each other for years 
(Lubenow 1992: 83), and even specialists in dif-
ferent parts of anatomy do not communicate in 
a way that would allow for a unifĳied view of the 
human organism. There is a very real risk that this 
conceptual drawing and quartering of the human 
organism and the inconsistencies that stem from 
it contribute to the evolutionary sciences’ less than 
coherent critique of hereditarian racialism.
Troublesome Reﬂ ection
For all its failures, Troublesome Inheritance does 
provide scholars of human biology with a foil that 
we can use to evaluate our standard critique of he-
reditarian racialism. My own view of the image cast 
back at me from Wade’s book is that the critique 
is both weak and in need of considerable revision.
Take the oft-cited observation that the propor-
tion of variation within races is a small fraction of 
the overall variation both in absolute terms and 
relative to other organisms (Lewontin [1972] gives 
the fĳirst estimate, and it is cited in places as far 
afĳield as political philosophy [e.g., Appiah 1985]). 
Estimating this proportion assumes that races are 
actually there. Without a racial or other unrealistic 
model, this statistic has no evolutionary interpreta-
tion (Long and Kittles 2003). The same applies to 
partitioning among-population variation without 
nesting populations into races. By deploying this 
fact as though it carries substantial evolutionary 
meaning, a critic of hereditarian racialism is argu-
ing about how much of the variation race might 
account for and what social implications it might 
entail while implicitly conceding that a racial tax-
onomy is legitimate.
Likewise, scientists often appeal to isolation by 
distance, which proposes an equilibrium between 
the among-group diversifying efffect of random 
genetic drift and homogenizing efffects of gene flow 
among neighboring groups (Wright 1943), when 
talking about human variation (Eisenberg and 
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Hayes 2011; Handley et al. 2007). This includes re-
cent responses to Troublesome Inheritance in online 
popular science venues (Fuentes 2014; Rafff 2014). 
Isolation by distance fares little better than the 
race model when fĳit to human population genomic 
data (Hunley et al. 2009), dulling any critique of 
hereditarian racialism that uses it.
The most perplexing thing about both Wade’s 
insistence that there are races in the taxonomic 
sense and the fĳixation on dispelling notions of 
biological race on the part of critics of hereditar-
ian racialism is that the existence of biological 
races is not a necessary condition for an argument 
about the coevolution of society and behavior in 
diffferent parts of the world. Evolved among-group 
diffferences require only genetic variation and the 
action of evolutionary forces (Lewontin 1974). It 
does not matter if spatial diffferences in the bulk 
of the genome are racially patterned or entirely 
clinal. Wade could have caused the critique of 
hereditarianism racialism a considerable bother 
had he pointed this out.
One point of agreement among nearly all par-
ties is that we can say with some certainty what 
human variation was like at a single point in time 
and that this point in time is uniquely relevant 
to problems of race today. This anthropological 
genetic present is usually conceived of as being 
sometime in the mid-15th century before transoce-
anic European conquest and colonialism (Marks 
1995). It tends to be marked through the use of the 
present tense. Hereditarian racialism holds that 
there really are races (read: were in the anthro-
pological genetic present) while conceding some 
blurriness of boundaries between races. Its critics 
often claim that human variation really is clinal but 
allow that the rate of change of a trait in space can 
vary. Neither claim reflects the present distribution 
of genetic variation in social or geographic spaces, 
and neither question is framed in such a way that 
answers to them could be informative about race 
and genetics today.
The Evolutionary Consequences 
of Racism
The peril of situating arguments about genetics and 
race in the anthropological genetic present is that it 
allows us to talk about race without talking about 
racism. This stymies our attempts to make sense 
of race and genetics because the only coherent 
theories of race depend on the explanatory power 
of racism. The sociologist and philosopher W. E. B. 
Du Bois and his inheritors model race and racism 
as being coconstituted in a political process acting 
on multigenerational time scales (Du Bois 1903, 
1920; Carbonella and Kasmir 2008; Harrison 1992; 
Visweswaran 1998). This is in opposition to the view 
anthropologists receive from Franz Boas that race 
is primary and that racism arises from conflict be-
tween races and can be mitigated primarily through 
race mixture (Boas 1921).
In this view, races—or, more properly, ra-
cialized groups—are produced as people enact 
political control or have political control enacted 
on them in the form of economic exploitation, seg-
regation, genocide, dispossession, or other depre-
dations. By this rationale, an African American race 
emerges over several generations from a disparate 
set of groups of people with no previous sense of 
kinship through the sharing of a history of slavery 
and struggle against it and other forms of racism 
(Du Bois 2007; Visweswaran 1998). Diffferent ways 
of reckoning race in diffferent parts of the world are 
the product of the several manifestations of racism. 
For the remainder of this essay I use race to refer 
to the general processes of marking individuals 
and grouping them through racism and “racialized 
groups” to refer to the groups that are formed by 
these processes. The dynamics of racialization as 
motivated by racism are historically contingent, 
and multiple racial formations each with their own 
way of delineating racialized groups have been 
produced at diffferent times and places by various 
kinds of racism.
Coupled with an eye toward how racism gov-
erns reproduction and inheritance (Fields 1990; 
Hollinger 2003), this way of modeling race might 
clarify our view of the relationship between race 
and genetics in the present day. This is particularly 
relevant to the role that race plays in issues in 
medicine and public health. In these cases, we 
are not so interested in the genetic variation in 
the Late Middle Ages as we are in the relation-
ships among genetic variation, race, and health in 
the present day. This requires an explanation of 
how the intergenerational efffects of the political 
management of reproduction and inheritance of 
status have shaped genetic variation.
By way of example, take a city in the US 
Midwest with a majority white population and 
a substantial minority representation of African 
Americans as tallied by the US Census. Were we to 
sample the genomes of the inhabitants of this city, 
we would fĳind a substantial departure from Hardy-
Weinberg-Castle equilibrium (HWCE), the model 
of what happens to genetic variation if random 
mating prevails and no evolutionary processes 
are at work. HWCE serves as the starting point for 
most evolutionary genetic problems, and such a 
large deviation from its expectation begs for an 
evolutionary explanation.
Genetics is the study of resemblances among 
relatives. Many of the ways in which race was codi-
fĳied into law and incorporated into custom were to 
govern who was to marry whom and how one could 
issue political status to one’s offfspring (Hollinger 
2003; Pascoe 1996). In the case of the black/white 
racial dichotomy that has so defĳined American life, 
antimiscegenation statutes punished couplings 
across racialized groups, and rules of hypodescent 
ensured fĳidelity in the inheritance of status (Pascoe 
1996). The departure from HWCE in our example 
is the product of racism’s (and sexism’s) past and 
ongoing roles in governing reproduction.
Thus, the allele frequency diffferences that we 
see between racialized groups as people under-
stand and experience them today are in part the 
product of racism acting to shape genetic variation. 
So too are the vast changes in the distribution of 
human genetic variation seen over the last few cen-
turies arising from the dispossession and genocide 
of indigenous peoples, forced migration of enslaved 
people, and the establishment of colonial and set-
tler populations. The diffferent racisms that shaped 
and continue to shape racialized groups across the 
world mean that any racism might shape genetic 
variation in a variety of ways through regulation of 
reproduction and inheritance of status. Put bluntly, 
racism has been a potent driver of human evolution 
over the last few centuries because of the way it 
afffects relatedness and the inheritance of genes.
Contrary to Wade’s version of history, genes 
probably played a largely passive role in race and 
human afffairs over the last several hundred years. 
Rather than natural selection evolving genetic 
propensities for diffferent political systems around 
the world, alleles drafted along in the wake of the 
racisms that defĳine racialized groups and continue 
to shape and govern their boundaries through the 
regulation of reproduction. This builds inciden-
tal correlations between racialized groups and 
genetic variation. Some of this genetic variation 
may contribute to phenotypic diffferences, some of 
which may present fairly sharp distinctions along 
racial lines such that they become racialized and 
used as a means of identifĳication and drawing 
social distinctions. Race and racism also construct 
environments in which humans grow, live, and die, 
leading to a confounding of genetic and environ-
mental efffects on phenotype (Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman 1973; Gravlee et al. 2009; Gravlee 2009; 
Lewontin 1975; Reverby 2010). Both are inherited 
through diffferent kinds of paths (i.e., genetic vs. 
social/legal), but the intergenerational persistence 
of racism can cause these modes of inheritance to 
covary with one another, calling into question our 
ability to assign the causes of diffference to either 
environment or genes.
We cannot explain the relationships among 
genes, race, and health outcomes without talking 
about the impact of racism both on living people 
and on their ancestors. Everything from life span 
(Edwards and Tuljapurkar 2005) to sexually trans-
mitted infections (Handcock and Jones 2006) is 
afffected by this historically contingent set of racial 
dynamics. This is for the simple reason that the 
present confĳiguration of races and distribution 
of genetic variation is what is relevant for human 
well-being now and in the future. Understand-
ing the prehistoric predicates for this variation is 
important to establish some sense of initial condi-
tions, but it is insufffĳicient for understanding the 
here and now. Without incorporating the efffects 
of racism into models of human variation today, 
we will not be able to have a cohesive theory of 
genes and race, and the scientifĳic critique of race 
will continue to have no teeth.
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